Pittsburgh Post-Gazette
Forum: Alaskan snake oil
Sunday, July 15, 2001
By Amory Lovins Hunter Lovins
Amory Lovins, a physicist, and Hunter Lovins, a lawyer and
political scientist, founded and lead Rocky Mountain Institute, an independent
nonprofit applied-research center that has long advised the oil and other
industries and the Department of Energy and Department of Defense. This
commentary is adapted from the institute's spring newsletter ( www.rmi.org )
Amory Lovins received a Heinz Award in 1997 for his work in energy efficiency
and renewable energy resources.
As Congress debates whether the oil potential beneath the
Arctic National Wildlife Refuge in
Alaska is worth the environmental damage caused by
extracting and burning it, it's worth asking:
Is it profitable? Is it necessary? Are there alternatives?
The debate focuses on environmental costs, and the human
rights of the threatened Gwich'in
people. This overlooks important reasons why drilling in the
Arctic Refuge would not improve but compromise national energy security and
economic vitality, especially when compared with alternatives that benefit both
-- and improve the environment. In the current issue of Foreign
Affairs (www.foreignaffairs.org), we explain why bringing
through the aging, vulnerable Trans-Alaska Pipeline System as much oil as
America now gets through the Strait of Hormuz is risky for energy security.
Here we focus instead on Arctic Refuge oil's even more immediate flaw -- dismal
economics.
For the oil industry to invest, the refuge must hold a lot
of oil, which must sell for enough to earn profits: at least $22 a barrel (in
December 2000 dollars, delivered to Los Angeles) for decades to come, according
to the U.S. Geological Survey. World oil prices have stayed above $22 only a
few times in the past three decades, and tend toward the teens. Sustaining more
than $22 a
barrel would contradict practically every forecast -- and
they're trending downward.
The Alaska Department of Revenue wants refuge drilling so
its citizens will keep getting rebates instead of paying income taxes. Yet in
April 2001, the department projected a steady decline to less than $13 a barrel
in 2009-10. The latest federal forecast, among the highest, stays below $22
until nearly 2020. Indeed, the USGS says that below $16 (plus any lease fee
paid to the
Treasury), no economically recoverable oil is likely to be
found. Alaska now forecasts prices below $16 throughout 2005-10. So why drill?
Of course, any forecast can be wrong, and most are. Oil
prices fluctuate randomly, and have for at least 115 years. Oil companies
routinely assess the resulting risk -- though in a public asset like the
refuge, the choice isn't simply a private business decision -- emphasizing such
fundamentals as technology and demand.
Astounding advances continue in the technology of finding
and extracting oil -- supercomputer visualization like X-ray eyes, and
precision-guided drilling to snake between pockets of oil. Could this tip the
economics in favor of refuge oil? Most industry experts think not. Their
proprietary refuge data suggests it's a multibillion-dollar gamble not worth
taking: the closer they
look, the less interested they get. If new technologies make
refuge oil worth seeking, oil practically anywhere else would be cheaper. If
oil everywhere is getting cheaper to find and lift, why look in one of the most
hostile and remote places on Earth?
During 1998-99, despite $25-a-barrel prices, the big U.S.
energy companies slashed their exploration budgets by 38 percent worldwide, 66
percent in onshore America. They see technology becoming more powerful, oil
more abundant, and long-term prices lower. If oil companies believed in high
long-term oil prices, they'd be drilling everywhere. They're not.
Couldn't drilling in the refuge relieve dependence on OPEC
oil? OPEC's percentage of the oil the U.S. imports has dropped by a third since
the high-water-mark of imports in 1977. Only one-fourth of U.S. oil now comes
from OPEC. Most imports come from more stable Western sources, and are so
diversified that a full-scale war in the Persian Gulf in 1991 caused no gas
lines at home. We're not as dependent on OPEC as some imply.
Nor are we short of fuels. Despite Bush administration claims that Arctic
Refuge drilling is urgent because, as California's electricity crisis showed,
the nation "desperately needs more fuel," only 1 percent of
California's
electricity (and 2 to 3 percent of the nation's electricity)
is made from oil.
If oil-import dependence or oil shortages were a serious
problem, would the solution to domestic depletion be to deplete faster? Or
might other solutions arrive sooner and cost less?
Better buys aren't hard to find. The past quarter-century's
efficiency revolution is now
"producing" over five times as much energy as all domestic oil
output (and 12 times the oil the U.S. imports from the Persian Gulf) simply by
using less energy to do more work in smarter ways. Two-fifths of the nation's
energy services now come from more efficient use. Each barrel
of oil supports twice the GDP it did in 1975 -- and that's
just for starters. Efficiency doesn't risk dry holes. It protects the climate,
creates widespread and stable jobs and improves the environment. It will never
suffer a terrorist attack. It creates a uniquely flexible and perennially
profitable form of all-American energy security. In fact, it
cut oil imports from the
Persian Gulf by 87 percent during 1976-85 alone.
But if Arctic Refuge oil isn't the cheapest way to provide
the services now provided by imported oil, then drilling in the refuge makes
the oil-import problem worse, because each dollar spent on the costly option
could have bought more of the cheap option instead. Choosing the costlier
option therefore results in using and importing more oil than if we'd bought
the best buys first. Yet efficiency is strangely invisible in today's refuge
oil debate.
The energy policies of the early 1970s and the mid-1980s
demonstrated how quickly energy gluts happen when customers seek efficiency. In
the early 1980s, the government increased supply slowly while customers
increased efficiency rapidly. Both efforts succeeded -- supply modestly,
efficiency stunningly. The two collided head-on. Between 1979 and 1986, GDP
rose by 20 percent while the nation's total energy use fell by 5 percent and
oil use fell by 13 percent. The glut crashed energy prices in 1985-86, sticking
suppliers with big investments but without the revenue to pay for them.
Efficiency providers suffered too: As attention waned, many energy-saving
programs, products and services faded from view for the next decade.
But unexpectedly, efficiency came roaring back. Despite
record-low and falling energy prices, U.S. energy intensity in 1996-99 fell by
3.2 percent per year -- nearly matching 1979-86, when energy prices were at
record highs and rising. In 2000, routine blips in oil and natural gas prices,
just as California's botched restructuring sent electricity prices sky-high,
further accelerated energy efficiency's sudden revival. In the first half of
2001, as Home Depot's sales of energy-saving products soared, Californians cut
electric demand by as much as it had grown in the past 5-10 years.
The 1986 price crash that ruined so many energy producers
had a simple recipe: Mix an underlying efficiency trend with a federal supply
stimulus. Today, the first ingredient is here; the second is promised by
President Bush. There's no reason to expect the same experiment to yield any
different result. Such train wrecks are unhealthy for the domestic energy
industries,
whose financial stability is an important element of energy
security.
As in the early 1980s, supply expansions will be far less
prompt and effective than energy efficiency. This is especially true for refuge
oil, which can produce nothing for nearly a decade anyway, and then, briefly,
about one percent of the world's oil. Efficiency, however, is such a vast
resource that capturing just a few percent of it -- very likely at prices high
enough to justify refuge drilling -- could crash oil prices and displace any oil
that might lurk beneath the refuge.
Even optimistic projections of oil from the refuge,
extracted over 30 years, would run just 2 percent of America's present fleet of
cars and light trucks. That much gasoline could be saved by making the fleet a
mere 0.4 mpg more efficient. During 1979-85, new light vehicles gained 0.4 mpg
every five months. This trend ended when President Reagan rolled back the
efficiency
standards -- thereby wasting one refuge's worth of oil, and
promptly doubling oil imports from the Persian Gulf. But had the efficiency
trend continued, America wouldn't have needed a drop of oil from the Gulf since
1985.
Just adopting aftermarket tires as efficient as the
originals would save several refuges' worth of oil. So would equipping appropriate
U.S. buildings with superefficient windows that also make buildings more
comfortable and cheaper to construct. Combining all the main U.S. efficiency
options available in 1989 (automobiles, buildings, industries -- everything)
could save today 54 refuges' worth of oil, at one-sixth the cost.
Energy efficiency is so outpacing advances in oil technology
that even cheap oil is becoming uncompetitive. This trend will intensify
because the next and biggest efficiency advances are aimed at oil's biggest user
-- cars. The average new American car is the highest expression of the Iron
Age. Its 24-mpg efficiency rating just tied for a 20-year low. The auto
industry can
do better, and is starting to. Briskly selling
hybrid-electric cars now include a Toyota's Prius (a 48-mpg five-seater) and
Honda's Insight (a 67-mpg two-seater). An American light vehicle fleet as
efficient as those two would save gasoline equivalent to the average output of
26 or 33 refuges' worth of crude oil.
General Motors, Ford and DaimlerChrysler family sedans that
achieve 72-80 mpg are already being tested. VW is selling a 78-mpg four-seat
subcompact in Europe, and plans a 2003 small city car at around 235 mpg. Then
come fuel-cell cars, now slated for 2003-05 production by eight mainstream
automakers. The chairs of four major oil companies have already acknowledged
the start of the oil endgame and the dawning of the Hydrogen Age.
Our organization, Rocky Mountain Institute, has been working
since 1991 to develop ultra-efficient vehicles. This effort was spun off in
1999 as a for-profit venture, Hypercar, Inc. (RMI is a major shareholder and
Amory Lovins is chairman. Its Web site is www.hypercar.com.) By combining fuel
cells with carbon-fiber autobodies, Hypercar has designed a spacious, safe,
uncompromised concept car that matches or beats every
attribute of a midsize sport utility vehicle, at a similar price, but gets 99
mpg -- 82 percent less fuel. A full 1999 U.S. fleet of vehicles so efficient
would save 42 refuges' worth of oil. Ultimately, globally, they'd save as much
oil as OPEC now sells.
Hydrogen-powered fuel-cell vehicles could also serve as
portable power stations. A full fleet of them, when parked (about 96 percent of
the time), would have enough generating capacity to displace the world's coal
and nuclear power plants 5-10 times over. They'd help pay for themselves
through electricity sales, while profitably halting up to two-thirds of climate
change. As Shell Hydrogen CEO Don Huberts, fuel-cell pioneer
Geoffrey Ballard and ex-Saudi Oil Minister Sheikh Yamani have observed, the
Stone Age did not end because the world ran out of stones, and the Oil Age will
not end because the world runs out of oil.
Arctic Refuge oil is a risk the nation can't afford. Its
benefits can be achieved by tapping just a few percent of the proven energy
efficiency reserves -- the cheaper, faster alternatives now winning in the
marketplace. These offer economic security and competitive advantage, immunity
to price shocks and supply manipulations, the market power to beat down cartel
prices,
and environmental benefits rather than costs.
If any oil exists under the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge,
its best, safest and most economic use will be forever holding up the ground
under America's last great wildland.